Trinity Bridges – Dallas (USA)

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Three bridges across the Trinity River designed by Calatrava in Dallas (USA).

Margaret Hunt Hill Bridge (opened 2012)

Margaret McDermott Bridge (2014 now rescheduled to 2017)

No data on third bridge

The following are crude notes and links I have gathered during my research. The information may be in various languages and is being updated during the research process until a full article is written. 

COST OF I-30 CALATRAVA BRIDGES BROKEN DOWN:

$798 million – Total cost of the Horseshoe project to reconstruct the Interstate 30 and Interstate 35 bridges over the Trinity River, including the Santiago Calatrava-designed bicycle and pedestrian bridges alongside I-30.

$114.9 million – Cost of the Santiago Calatrava-designed bicycle and pedestrian bridges ($102.9 million) and frontage roads ($12 million).

$74 million – Original planned cost for construction of Calatrava bridges.

$91.3 million – Federal funds available to cover cost of Calatrava bridges and frontage roads.

$11.6 million – Regional Transportation Council Funds for Calatrava Bridges and frontage roads

$12 million – Funding gap expected to be covered through $5 million Trinity Trust Foundation gift, money from city’s public arts fund and through cost-cutting

Issue: the state of Texas wants the three bridges for their functionality and to replace old decaying roads. The city of Dallas has its mind set on signature bridges to give this part of the town a different look. The city however does not have the money for this.

The Margaret McDermott Bridge, the second signature bridge, was originally scheduled to begin construction in 2011 with a completion date of 2014. However, as of December 2011, this bridge is now funded within the Project Pegasus initiative with construction contracts to be awarded in mid-2012; the new plan will feature ‘toned-down’ elements of its original arch design. Calatrava is still scheduled to perform design work.

http://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/Dallas-Still-Short-on-Money-for-New-I-30-Trinity-River-Bridge-187817841.html

city of dallas to decide on mcdermott bridge: does it want the 114 million version of a 74 million version that is less fancy but has the same functionality. the original plan by calatrava was even more expensive, including motorized traffic as well as pedestrians and cyclists. the current plan has been reduced to only pedestrians and cyclists.

The current $114 million I-30 plan was reduced to just hike and bike bridges along side a standard state roadway because the original Calatrava design was far more than the city could afford.

Griggs said the scaled down plan is still around $40 million more than it was to have been.

The cost overruns this early in the process are outrageous. These bridges can be very expensive when they’re designed by Santiago Calatrava and we don’t want these to be blank check,” Griggs said.

the city council decided to go through with the 144 million usd version of the project:

http://www.nbcdfw.com/traffic/stories/Second-Signature-Bridge-for-Dallas-Gets-Green-Light-188136101.html

The rest of the City Council voted in favor of a plan to close the $12 million gap by accepting a $5 million contribution from the Trinity Trust, transferring several million from other city bond funds and seeking “value engineering” savings from Calatrava and the contractor.

– the city council in its decision actually counts on calatrava to reduce costs. That would be a first in Calatrava history

http://blogs.dallasobserver.com/unfairpark/2011/04/sorry_dallas_news_but_i_cant_s.php

http://cityhallblog.dallasnews.com/2013/01/dallas-council-approves-funding-for-second-calatrava-bridgeamid-concerns-about-cost-over-runs-and-maintenance-price.html/

http://www.dallasnews.com/entertainment/columnists/scott-cantrell/20130120-cantrell-dallas-superficiality-reigns-again-because-of-another-bridge.ece

http://texas.construction.com/features/archive/0709_feature2.asp

http://www.pegasusnews.com/news/2011/jun/22/calatrava-bridge-dallas-looks-knockoff/

Bridges look identical to Reggio Emilia bridges in Italy

http://thehiddenlist.com/tag/margaret-hunt-hill-bridge/

http://forum.dallasmetropolis.com/showthread.php/30881-Trinity-Bridges?s=33e49c35024f84fcdcf6ba2dd739ace1

Recinto Ferial – Tenerife (ESP)

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Year: 1995

Cost: 15 million € over budget

The following are crude notes and links I have gathered during my research. The information may be in various languages and is being updated during the research process until a full article is written. 

http://www.eldia.es/2001-06-02/tenerife/tenerife21.htm

SÁBADO, 02 DE JUNIO DE 2001

 

Calatrava se desmarca de cualquier responsabilidad en las grietas del recinto

SANTA CRUZ DE TENERIFE (REDACCIÓN). El arquitecto e ingeniero Santiago Calatrava, diseñador del recinto ferial de la capital tinerfeña, aseguró ayer que no ha intervenido directamente en el proceso constructivo del edificio, por lo que no puede pronunciarse sobre «el origen, alcance y consecuencias de las deficiencias detectadas».

Calatrava remitió ayer un comunicado a los medios de comunicación en el que elude sus eventual responsabilidad en la aparición de grietas y fisuras en la sala multiusos del recinto, si bien asegura estar en contacto «tanto con la empresa constructora como con el Cabildo Insular de Tenerife y los ingenieros de Martínez Segovia, a los que he ofrecido mi asesoramiento para colaborar en la solución».

En su comunicado, el arquitecto indica que en 1992 la empresa Cubierta y Mzov., SA contactó con su oficina para colaborar en el concurso de proyecto y obra de la recinto ferial de muestras de Tenerife y que dicha colaboración quedó formalizada en un contrato en el que se estipuló que su prestación de servicios «se ceñía única y exclusivamente al diseño arquitectónico (anteproyecto)».

Una vez que el Cabildo otorgó el primer premio a la propuesta presentada, continúa Calatrava, la empresa constructora contrató los servicios de ingeniería de la empresa Martínez Segovia, Fernández Pallás y Asociados SA para llevar a cabo los cálculos de estructura de hormigón y metálicas. Asimismo, se contrató a la empresa IGS para el desarrollo de las instalaciones, mientras que su despacho desarrollaba los planos de diseño arquitectónico.

En el escrito, Calatrava recuerda que una vez obtenida la aprobación por parte del Cabildo, la dirección de obra se llevó a cabo por los servicios técnicos de la propia Corporación, «siendo el director de la obra el arquitecto Joaquín Amigó y el aparejadore Manzano». Añade, asimismo, que durante la fase de ejecución de la obra, el alcance del trabajo a realizar por su parte era la «asistencia en obra»

http://www.islandconnections.eu/1000003/1000009/0/39376/tenerife-article.html

The news (Venice) has prompted one local party here to urge Santa Cruz and the Tenerife Cabildo to follow suit and take action against the architect for the bills for the city’s Recinto Ferial exhibition centre and the nearby Auditorium concert hall. According to the ANC party, the cost overruns on each (€15 million for the former and nearly 50 million for the latter) should be recovered from Calatrava, using the Venice action as legal precedent.

Tor Vergata – Rome (IT)

IMG_5048

(Image courtesy of http://www.romethesecondtime.com )

Project for new venues to host the 2009 World Championships swimming. The project was abandoned before completion. The half finished buildings that cost Italy 250 million € lay abandoned in the fields outside Rome.

Budget: 320 million €

Cost at moment of abandon: 250 million €

The following are crude notes and links I have gathered during my research. The information may be in various languages and is being updated during the research process until a full article is written. 

8tor_vergata tor vergata

http://romethesecondtime.blogspot.com.es/2012/06/santiago-calatravas-unfinished-swimming.html

http://www.arcspace.com/features/santiago-calatrava/tor-vergata-university-roma-ii/

Opera – Luzern (CH)

pavilhc3a3o-flutuante-sobre-o-lago-lucerna-1989

Plan for a “floating” opera in Lake Luzern (CH). The above is one of the original drawings by Calatrava dated 1989 of the project that was presented for competition but did not win.

Calatrava presented the exact same project in 2007 as a floating opera for Palma de Mallorca (ESP) for which he received 1,2 million € of public money. Again the project was not carried out.

The following are crude notes and links I have gathered during my research. The information may be in various languages and is being updated during the research process until a full article is written. 

project that was never built and was presented years later by Calatrava as a project for the opera de palma that Calatrava received a lot of money for even though it was never built.

project uit 1989 ter ere van 700 jarig bestaan van zwitserland. Project is nooit gebouwd en werd door calatrava opnieuw gebruikt voor de palma arena, die er ook nooit kwam.

http://www.diariodemallorca.es/mallorca/2010/06/10/juez-investiga-calatrava-entrego-govern-proyecto-opera-original/577655.html

La revista “El Croquis” publicó en 1992 un número monográfico sobre Calatrava, donde aparecía una amplia información respecto al concurso para construir un edificio emblemático en el lago suizo de Lucerna. El juez del caso Palma Arena quiere acceder a esa publicación, que forma parte de un fondo bibliográfico, para poder comparar ambos proyectos.

http://peganarquitetura.com/2012/08/01/croqui-santiago-calatrava-desenhos-esculturais/

Estacion Alameda – Valencia (ESP)

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Budget for bridge and metro station: 12,6 million €

Real cost: 36 million €

The following are crude notes and links I have gathered during my research. The information may be in various languages and is being updated during the research process until a full article is written. 

http://www.20minutos.es/noticia/303730/0/parchean/obras/calatrava/

lekt

Bodega Ysios – Laguardia (ESP)

bodega Ysios

The prestigious Calatrava-designed bodega leaks, making indoor climate control impossible which may have devastating effects on the stored wines. The owners have taken Calatrava to court claiming 2 million € in necessary repairs.

The following are crude notes and links I have gathered during my research. The information may be in various languages and is being updated during the research process until a full article is written. 

http://www.eitb.com/es/noticias/sociedad/detalle/1314896/ysios-demanda-calatrava–la-bodega-ysios-demanda-calatrava/l/

http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2013/04/15/paisvasco/1366052792_259322.html

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GQREYuP8mos

april 2013

La bodega Ysios, diseñada por el arquitecto valenciano Santiago Calatrava, situada al norte de Laguardia, Araba, tiene goteras y humedades desde hace años. La cubierta metálica está generando numerosos problemas de filtraciones debido, posiblemente, a problemas derivados de un insuficiente anclaje a la estructura.

Los “arreglos” no han podido acabar con las goteras y humedades, pero, según han asegurado los responsables de la bodega, “la calidad del producto no se ve afectada gracias a las eficaces medidas que se toman en bodega para controlar en todo momento la temperatura y humedad óptimas para la elaboración del vino”

La empresa ha demandado en el juzgado número cuatro de primera instancia e instrucción de Vitoria-Gasteiz a Santiago Calatrava, como proyectista, pero también como director facultativo de la obra así como a la empresa que la ejecutó, Ferrovial, SA.

La bodega pide dos millones de euros para reparar la cubierta, que consiste en colocar una nueva sobre la actual, después de acondicionar la estructura.

La cubierta metálica que dibuja rectángulos en el cielo pero que, al parecer, no soporta demasiado bien las tensiones de los cambios de temperatura que hay en la Rioja Alta, está generando numerosos problemas de filtraciones debido, posiblemente, a problemas derivados de un insuficiente anclaje a la estructura.

Los numerosos parches que se han realizado en coordinación con el arquitecto, los problemas no sólo no se han solucionado, sino que, según un informe técnico pericial pedido por la propiedad y aportado a la demanda, han acabado por agravar los problemas de estructura del tejado.

El resultado es que sigue habiendo goteras y humedades cuando que complican la habitabilidad y no ofrecen una atmósfera estable y controlada para la producción de vinos.

 

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/17/architect-santiago-calatrava-leaking-roof

Now Domecq, the owner of the winery, has said it is fed up with the botched attempts of Calatrava’s original builders at fixing the roof and wants money from them so that it can bring in fresh architects and engineers to design a new one.

Llotja de Sant Jordi – Alcoy (ESP)

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The community space designed by Calatrava has never met the legal security standards, extra costs have been made to improve (but not solve) this issue. Its steep stairs make access very difficult.

Built: 1995

The following are crude notes and links I have gathered during my research. The information may be in various languages and is being updated during the research process until a full article is written. 

alcoy trap

Bijnaam: La bandeja

http://www.levante-emv.com/comunitat-valenciana/2011/04/30/alcoi-estudia-cerrar-llotgeta-calatrava-falta-seguridad/802882.html

http://www.diarioinformacion.com/alcoy/2011/04/28/deficiencias-seguridad-ponen-peligro-futuro-sala-subterranea-calatrava/1120779.html

é´´en van de eerste karakteristieke werken van calatrava. Een ondergrondse zaal onder de plaza de españa van alcoy (alicante).

Enige onderdelen avnd e zaal zijn nooit gebouwd, zoals de pilaar van san jorge.

La sala surgió como sala de música y teatro, pero la defectuosa audición provocó que se tuviera que reconvertir a unos usos más sociales, como exposiciones o congresos de pequeño mediano. También en esto hubo problemas, pues la primera exposición que se organizó no pudo llegar a celebrarse porque los cuadros no pasaban por la puerta: eran demasiado grandes. Ahora ya es “acústicamente satisfactoria”, pero después de una inversión de 600.000 euros del Gobierno central en el Plan E.

Jamás ha podido adecuarse a las normas de seguridad, que se han intensificado con los años. Fuentes del gobierno municipal del PP admiten que el ayuntamiento ha tenido que certificar oficialmente, a raíz de una petición externa, que la sala subterránea carece de licencia de apertura.

las dos escalinatas de entrada y salida. Ambas, según se resalta desde el gobierno del PP, tienen una pendiente inadecuada con respecto a la normativa y la anchura de los escalones es más reducida de la establecida por la legislación de seguridad vigente. La subsanación de estos extremos se considera “imposible”, debido a que obligaría a una reforma urbanística de enorme magnitud

in 2009 (se están volviendo a reparar los polémicos cristales y desarrollando mejoras, sobre todo técnicas, en el interior de la sala subterránea) zijn herstel en verbeteringswerken uitgevoerd voor een bedrag van 600.000€.Calatrava nam direct contact op met de gemeente om de garantie te krijgen dat de “integridad artística y arquitectónica” van zijn werk niet aangetast zou worden.

Calatrava otorgó una iluminación “natural” a la sala, para lo cual colocó bandas acristaladas en la superficie de la bandeja. Evidentemente, esto incrementó la luminosidad de la Llotja, pero las “mascletàs” que se disparan sobre la bandeja y los trabucazos del Alardo los rompían, lo que provocaba que cada vez que llovía el agua entrara y hubiera auténticas inundaciones. Las imágenes de la exposición repleta de cubos para recoger el agua o de la superficie cubierta con un plástico -que los detractores bautizaron como el “condón”- son impagables, hasta el punto que se llegó a editar una postal.

2011: nieuw systeem om wateroverlast van llotja tegen te gaan. Had last van overlast sinds de opning in 1995. e va a proceder a la sustitución de todos los cristales de la superficie de la bandeja de la plaza de España -una actuación que ya se ha efectuado en alguna que otra ocasión- y, a la vez, se colocarán desagües para canalizar las aguas pluviales, “evitando las goteras que tenemos”.

Está previsto que la recogida de pluviales se efectúe a través de canalizaciones de mayor tamaño de las originales. Cabe significar que uno de los problemas crónicos que ha registrado la Llotja desde su construcción es la presencia de goteras en épocas de lluvia

http://www.diarioinformacion.com/alcoy/2009/06/09/nuevo-sistema-desagues-llotja/896136.html

Calatrava ontwierp ook het plein met de toegangen etc voor de llotja.

http://www.abiyoyo.com/articles/1004_llotja_de_sant_jordi_alcoy_alcoi.html

106227_resize_640_420 106224_resize_640_420 106221_resize_640_420 106219_resize_640_420 106216_resize_640_420

Bridge Zona Norte (not built) – Alcoy (ESP)

2011-03-29_IMG_2011-03-22_01.04.06__M0601ALCOY.jpg

Santiago Calatrava and mayor José Sanus planning the bridge

In 1995 Calatrava received 90 million pesetas (540.000 €) for the paper model of a bridge that was never built because the local government found no way to finance the project.

The following are crude notes and links I have gathered during my research. The information may be in various languages and is being updated during the research process until a full article is written. 

http://www.abc.es/hemeroteca/historico-08-10-2003/abc/Valencia/el-ayuntamiento-de-alcoy-pagara-85000-%C2%A4-a-calatrava-por-un-puente-que-no-se-construyo_212482.html

Viaducto-Zona Norte, que jamás se ha construido, en una actuación fallida por la que el arquitecto cobró 540.000 euros, que tuvo que desembolsar el ayuntamiento después de un proceso judicial.

http://www.diarioinformacion.com/alcoy/2011/03/22/sanus-pago-calatrava-540000-euros-puente-construyo/1107348.html

plan uit 1995 onder socialistische burgemeester. Afspraak toen:

Calatrava debía percibir el 7,5% del coste del puente por el anteproyecto con maqueta y proyecto y el 3,5%, por la dirección de obras, más 66.000 euros por la maqueta y planos. En total, 1,8 millones, al margen de sobrecostes.

Brug werd afgeblazen omdat de provincie valencia de brug niet wilde financieren. Calatrava had in 1995 al 540.000€ ontvangen. Hij was hiermee niet tevreden en na een proces wees de TSJ (?)en julio de 2003 le reconocío 85.547 euros en concepto de indemnización y 4.792, de intereses. En total, 90.340 euros. Calatrava percibió así 631.251 euros por el puento que no se construyó.

Fases de cobro parcial se daban exactamente igual en Alcoy que en castellón: A la firma del contrato, el ayuntamiento debía abonarle el 10% de los honorarios de redacción del proyecto (135.000 euros, cuyo pago se aprobó en abril de 1995) y el 30% (factura de 405.000 euros ratificada en septiembre de 1995) a la entrega del anteproyecto.
Asimismo, la contratación fue a dedo, acogiéndose a una de las excepciones de la normativa “por cincunstancias técnicas y excepcionales que se conjugan en la personalidad” de Calatrava. Con todo, hay diferencias respecto al Consell: Las condiciones se conocieron en el pleno y de hecho el contrato se aprobó con la abstención del PP. El ayuntamiento le pidió una garantía (de la que le eximió el Consell), de 54.091 euros, que le devolvió en febrero de 2000.

http://www.diarioinformacion.com/alcoy/2011/03/22/sanus-pago-calatrava-540000-euros-puente-construyo/1107348.html

Peña Boulevard Bridge and Denver International Airport – Denver (USA)

diasouthterminalnewweb1

Calatrava left the project for the new Denver airport after budget had been reduced by 150 million USD. Usually the costs of Calatrava´s design rise during construction, earning Calatrava more money (he makes a percentage of the final cost). Apparently reducing costs to adapt to new situations is not a challenge favoured by  Calatrava.

The following are crude notes and links I have gathered during my research. The information may be in various languages and is being updated during the research process until a full article is written.

Megalomane drijvende kracht: Kim Day

Calatrava left after DIA pared down its budget last year from $650 million to $500 million — an amount, Calatrava’s representatives said, that would have hindered his vision for the project. (Although DIA had already paid Calatrava $12.9 million for his work and ultimately a further $800,000 to continue to use his designs.)

Niet gebouwd omdat Calatrava het project verliet. Project betaald door het vliegveld, en is daardoor indirect publiek geld (check).

http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_18972016

leuk: naam van bedrijf van Calatrava dat werkte op project denver: festina lente –haast je langzaam. Latijn voor werk niet te hard, maak je niet moe.

http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_19350886

in 2011:

voor de bouw van het denver international airport mag gebruik worden gemaakt van de tekeningen die calatrava hiervoor had gemaakt voordat hij zich uit het project terugtrok. Hiervoor betaalt het vliegveld 543.000USD voor nog openstaande rekeningen en 250.000USD voor de gebruiksrechten van tekeningen van Calatrava. In totaal heeft calatrava 13,8 miljoen USD ontvangen voor dit project.

Een enkel designonderdeel is niet toegestaan te gebruiken.

$12.9 million for two years of work on a project still in the conceptual phase.

A review of project invoices, which DIA provided to The Denver Post in response to an open-records request, shows $5.17 million in lump-sum payments for work done by Calatrava himself, mostly “visioning.” There is little accounting of what Calatrava did and how much time he spent on it — which is not unusual with star architects but isn’t always the case.

The records provide other glimpses at the cost of doing business with someone of Calatrava’s stature, including more than $640,000 spent on models and animation whose ownership is now in question.

“It’s a hard sell,” said Denver City Councilman Charlie Brown, a critic of Calatrava’s selection. “It’s just hard for the average person to comprehend this. But we won’t know whether we got our money’s worth until we find out whether we are allowed to use what we have.”

“I know, as Denver, we like to kick these high-profile international architects under the bus,” Barnes-Gelt said. “But in my opinion, the real fault rests with these incredibly overstaffed, marginally competent project managers that are supposed to be overseeing the projects.”
Architect Santiago Calatrava earned as much as $475,000 a month in lump sums for his work on DIA’s South Terminal expansion project. That work, however, is mostly undefined.View the invoicessubmitted to project manager Parsons Corp., which provide more detail on Calatrava s work. .

comic image 1+textcomic image 2+textcomic image 3+text

http://www.westword.com/2010-03-04/news/dia-dreams-aviation-director-kim-day-plans-to-take-dia-where-no-airport-has-gone-before/

http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_18893836

http://www.blouinartinfo.com/news/story/757469/denver-international-airport-clips-the-wings-of-santiago-calatravas-ostentatious-design

January 24, 2012

Months after budget cuts prompted Spanish architect Santiago Calatrava to walk away fromDenver International Airport’s South Terminal redevelopment project, DIA is still moving on without him. The airport unveiled a revision to Calatrava’s designs that is hewed down in both in size and cost, amended by Gensler Architects with Denver-basedAndersonMasonDale Architects.

Turning Torso – Malmö (SWE)

Turning-Torso-Malmo-1

The highest building in Scandinavia. Although initially budgeted at 550 million Swedish Krona, its final cost was around 1600 million (approx 190 million €) , to be paid by a public housing company and therefore indirectly by the Swedish tax payer.

The following are crude notes and links I have gathered during my research. The information may be in various languages and is being updated during the research process until a full article is written. 

Turning Torso is the tallest building in Scandinavia and was designed by the Spanish architect Santiago Calatrave. The 190.4 metre tall building began construction in 2001 and was completed in 2005.

Ha recibido el premio MIPIM en la feria de la construcción de Cannes (Francia) de 2005 al mejor edificio residencial del mundo.

Gebouwd op initiatief van El entonces director gerente de la cooperativa sueca de viviendas HSB (la mayor de Suecia, fundada en 1923, promotora y actual propietaria del edificio), Johnny Örbäck

http://www.bizzbook.com/map/turningtorsocalatrava.html

lijst gegevens over de toren

In2008 werd de waarde van de toren geschat op 2 miljard kronen (300 miljoen USD)

eigenaar HSB probeert inmiddels de wolkenkrabber te evrkopen, verwacht wordt dat ze er zelfs winst op zullen maken (begin 2012).

Calatrava acepta el encargo pero sus delirantes caprichos, los errores en la cimentación y las complicaciones en la estructura del edificio, provocan que el presupuesto se desvíe hasta adquirir unas proporciones monstruosas. Este proceso se puede admirar en el documental ‘El socialista, el arquitecto y el Turning Torso’, rodado por Fredrik Gertten. A lo largo del metraje, a medida que la deuda se engorda hasta niveles estratosféricos -40 millones de coronas suecas- el pobre Johnny Örbäck se va demacrando y apagando, mientras que Calatrava luce ufano, en su salsa, derrochando dinero ajeno. Finalmente, la historia tiene un final que pone a cada uno en su sitio. La HSB quiebra. Örbäck es procesado por estafa y Calatrava finaliza su obra con otro contratista. La ‘torre socialdemócrata’ se convierte en un rascacielos con pisos de lujo para multimillonarios.

Project was begonnen om goedkope woonruimte te creëren en wordt uitenindelijk een duur project met miljonairswoningen. Calatrava mag het een mooi gebouw vinden, maar dan is er toch iets misgegaan onderweg?

Document incl geschiedenis van de toren:

Constructing buildings and ambitions – The Turning Torso case

Door Kjell Tryggestad, 2006 verbonden aan de copenhagen business school.

Belangrijk: geen directe quotes uit artikel halen.

http://www.clibyg.org/dyn/files/knowledge_items/15-file/Tryggestad_Constructing_buildings_ambitions.pdf

in eerste instantie was afgesproken met Calatrava dat hij 16% zou verdienen van e totale kosten van het project. Toen de plannen steeds duurder werden is dit herzien. Project manager Ingvar Nohlin probeerde zich te houden aan het “realistische” budget van 730 miljoen SEK.  In his own words “ Dear god, I said to

him [Calatrava], this [16% contract] you can forget. The more expensive you make this

building, the more money you earn.” Instead, a fixed price contract was written that defined

the fee according to the architect’s area of responsibility. The area of responsibility had thus

to be more clearly defined and separated from coordination, apartments, and installations, like

ventilations. “ You [Calatrava] has responsibility for construction and [exterior] architecture”

This part of the total cost was estimated to 350 M. SEK. Then project management negotiated

a 15% fee on the basis of the latter and further defined it as a fixed price contract to be paid in

US dollars. “This implies that for a project of 1.5 billion [SEK], I have to pay 53 million

[SEK] for a world recognized architect, or some 3.5% [of total cost]”.

Problemen in ontwerp van calatrava´s studio:

With the drawings in their hands, concerns emerged among those responsible for structural

stability of the high rising building. During the meeting a question was posed to the

representative from the Calatrava office. He was asked to locate the ‘resultant’ for the

building (measuring the vertical axis of the construction). The resultant was pointed out in the

drawings to the structural checker, which replied that the building was not stable. The main

argument was that the radius at the base was too small, and that the estimated ‘resultant’ was

outside the structural core of the building. Relocating the dislocated resultant would require a

different set of architectural drawings that added width to the radius, and hence more concrete

and steel reinforcements at the structural core.

There was also a related issue, concerning the structural stability of the floors below ground

level. According to the project management and the structural checker there were too many

doors and holes in the walls, which made the construction less stable. Uiteindelijk bleek de ontworpen basis niet stabiel. Dit gaf het probleem dat de bowu al was begonnen zonder dat duidelijk was hoe de fundamenten en ondergronds verdiepingen er uit zouden moeten zien. Uiteindelijk kreeg de toren twee ondergrondse verdiepingen in plaats van 4. In plaats van de verdiepingen kwam puur beton en ijzer. Dit gaf extra stabiliteit aan de toren en was bovendien kostenbesparend. Op dit moment werd het budget bijgesteld naar 850 miljoen SEK.

Instead of being a pro-active controlling device in the hands of project

management, the budget had turned into a rather re-active and badly updated version of the

accounting ledger already in use.

Hierna bleek de bovengrondse constructie niet stabiel. Na verloop van tijd zouden de delen die het verst van de centrale ruggegraat van het gebouw af stonden loslaten en naar beneden hangen. Calatrava besloot uiteindelijk nieuwe ontwerptekeningen te maken. “ If he [Calatrava] had not

changed at this particular point, it would have gone to hell, to put it frankly. We would not

have approved it. We would never have done that”

vertragingen traden op.. The delays might also have been furthered by the

workload at the Calatrava office “ to be honest, capacity can also be involved. During this

period, the office had an exceptionally amount of spectacular projects to draw and build, like

the Olympic stadium in Athens”.

Het originele plan was dat appartementen verkocht zouden worden aan toekomstige eigenaren die vervolgens hun eigen eisen konden overleggen met het bedrijf dat verantwoordelijk was voor het ontwerpen van de binnekant van het gebouw. Dit bleek in de praktijk onmogelijk en korte tijd nadat enkele appartementen verkocht waren, besloot hsb dat appartementen verhuurd zouden worden. Zo werd hsb eigenaar van de appartementen en kon het zelf besluiten nemen over een meer uniforme inrichting van de appartementen.

2004: Op deze manier werd de woningcorporatie hsb steeds meer een commercieel bedrijf dat voorbij leek te gaan aan zijn oorspronkelijke doel: zorgen voor betaalbare huizen voor de zweden. Toen de kosten van het project maar bleven oplopen trokken sommige investeerders hun geld terug uit hsb en werd de voorzitter vervangen.

Instead

of keeping their savings and investments in the federation, some local members now started to

withdraw their capital and opened new accounts in an ordinary bank. Spokespersons for

emerging concerned groups, like the national association for cheap housing, claimed the 25

Turning Torso to be a phallic symbol and a severe deviation from the social values that once

governed the federation.

During the years that followed the decision to start the project the budget was revised on

numerous occasions. As it were the direction of these revisions was almost without exception

to take into account unexpected increases in costs, most notably for increased quantities of

steel and concrete and by implication, prolonged time for construction and increased total

costs.

Het rapport verklaart hoe het budget van het project zo uit de hand kon lopen (P25 >):

Instead of being a pro-active controlling device in the hands of project

management, the budget had turned into a rather re-active and badly updated version of the

accounting ledger already in use.

The successive transformation of the budget for total project costs; from

being this pro-active management control tool, to becoming a re-active tool hardly discernable

from the accounting ledger, is intriguing. How can these changes in the role of the budget be

explained?

Bij de internationale presentatie van het gebouw ontweek Calatrava de vraag waarom hij de kosten van het gebouw in eerste instantie zo verkeerd had ingeschat:

“There is nothing wrong, and you are sitting here on the 54th floor. The building is very

stable and solid. As an engineer I know that. If there were something wrong you would

not be sitting here. It is also a beautiful building, and you have to understand that it is not

one made according to standards. It is an innovative building”.

The new CEO and project owner supplied the architect by explaining,

“If anything was wrong, it was the first budget estimations that severely underestimated

the costs of conducting such a project”. The comment by the CEO prompted another reply

from the audience. “But if the budget had been correct in the first place, we would not be

sitting here today, right? The CEO replied dryly: “That is entirely correct”.

Oftewel: als de organisatie van tevoren had geweten wat het bouwen van de toren zou kosten, hadden ze hem nooit gebouwd. Dat geldt waarschijnlijk voor veel van calatrava´s projecten.

Ambitions to construct according to the prototype turns out to be stronger than ambitions to

construct according to the two year time frame inscribed into the budget.

Again, there is a related lesson on uncertainty that

deserves to be emphasized; no one could have known in advance that the situation with the

unstable building would emerge. To know in advance what the correct budget would be like is

to ask for too much.

http://architectism.com/the-stunning-turning-torso-in-malmo-sweden/turning-torso-malmo-1/

http://inhabitat.com/sustainable-and-twisted-turning-torso-sculptural-building-in-malmo-by-santiago-calatrava/